Equivocal transcendence: situating Heidegger's ontology within a medieval schema

Abstract

During the Middle Ages, scholastic thinkers debated the question of whether being is univocal, anaological, or equivocal. Drawing from the tension between Thomistic analogia entis and Scotistic univocity, I argue that Heidegger’s early ontology crosses the boundaries that demarcate this triple distinction between univocal, analogical, and equivocal being. In Heidegger’s ontology, being is univocal insofar as it is considered in itself and analogical insofar as Dasein, non-Dasein entities, and being are concerned, while the relationship between god and being is equivocal. These relationships are, in turn, hierarchically related such that equivocity grounds univocity which is, in turn, more fundamental than analogy. Now, because the equivocal relationship between God and being is more fundamental than the univocity of being, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is governed by a more primordial commitment to keep God at a distance. Hence, the hierarchy that obtains between the three medieval categories brings into suspicion Heidegger’s allegedly basic ontology. Far from being a neutral articulation of the way being reveals itself, Heidegger’s ontology is, more fundamentally, theologically grounded.