Time and succession: Plotinus' conception of time as a cosmological principle in Ennead III.7

Abstract

This thesis argues that Plotinus differentiates between time, which he identifies with the dispersive contemplation of Soul, and temporality, which is the ontological structure of sensible Nature. In the refutation of his predecessors, Plotinus shows why this distinction must be upheld: first, it ensures the conceptual consistency of the theory of time by taking into consideration that time must be prior to motion; second, the distinction between time and temporality ensures the ontological unity of time by removing time from the realm of dispersed phenomena and giving it the status of a principle of temporal phenomenality. Because time thereby mediates between the creative Soul and created phenomena, it takes on a vital role in the continuity of the emanation, the procession of Being. By relating the higher creative part and the lower created part of Soul time sits at the node of Soul‘s twofoldness and thereby ensures a continuous emanation of sensible Nature from the higher principles.